

Why Does the Majority Party Bother to Have Minority Party Members on Committees? ¹

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Abstract

The majority party in the U.S. House controls the entire legislative process. In particular, the committee system is often interpreted as a tool to promote partisan goals. The majority party could construct committees by including only *their* party members. In reality, this has never happened. Why does the majority party bother to have minority party members on committees? In this paper, we provide an *informational* rationale for the bipartisan committee system via a simple signaling game. We show that the majority party on the floor can extract better information and, therefore, enact more preferred policy outcomes by forming committees with members of both parties.

Introduction

The majority party in the House can control the entire legislative process by using various intra-party coercion mechanisms and inter-party organizational advantages. The committee system itself is often interpreted as a tool to promote partisan goals. Party leaders strongly influence committees by assigning members into committees, creating and destroying committees, regulating tasks, resources, and committee personnel, and reviewing committee decisions (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005).

One thing that appears to prevent more complete control of committees is the presence of members of the other party. Advocates of partisan theories might suggest that party leaders can influence copartisans more easily because of institutional factors; advocates of informational theories might suggest that copartisans need less influencing because they are more likely to hold similar policy preferences. Either way, minority party members on committees might be viewed as moving final outcomes from that preferred by the majority party or moving resources away from the majority party members, or both.

If the majority party considers minority party committee members a burden, it could choose to exclude minority party members from the committee system. So far, the majority party has never employed this option. Why does the majority party have minority party members on committees? In other words, what benefit do minority party members on committees provide *to the majority party on the floor*? We provide one possible explanation to this question via a simple signaling game.

We argue that, in equilibrium, the majority party on the floor has an incentive to include minority party members on committees. Specifically, the majority party can extract *informational* benefits by having minority party members on committees. This is an informational rationale for the presence of minority party members on committees. Without relying on normative arguments or a repeated game framework we show that the majority party can expect to be better off by having minority party members on committees.

How to Approach the Question

Some have just assumed that the majority party cannot exclude minority party members from the committee system. They usually justify this with normative rationales, such as upholding democratic values, preserving institutional legitimacy, or defending minority rights. For example, minority party members and their constituents would feel much more democratic when they are included in the decision-making process. Supporters and voters for the minority party would have higher political efficacy when their representatives are actively participating in the policy-making process.

Although these rationales are an important part of the story, our approach differs in that we do not rely on normative motivations for political actors. Rather, we assume a high level of utilitarianism for all members in Congress, allowing each member of Congress in the model to choose an option based on cost-benefit calculations. If the majority party came to the conclusion that it would be better off without minority party members on committees, this model allows that choice, endogenizing the choice between a *majoritarian* or *bipartisan committee system*.

Our approach also differs from the approach of “repeated games.” In order to eliminate or reduce the social inefficiency observed in the equilibria of games like the prisoner’s dilemma game, many rely on the logic of repeated games (Fudenberg and Maskin 1986; Calvert 1995). The idea is that a player can be deterred from obtaining short-term gain by the threat of punishment that reduces long-term benefits. Applying the method here, for example, consider a hypothetical committee system which does not allow minority party members. The majority party knows it might lose majority status in some future election, after which it could reasonably be concerned with being excluded from the committee system. In this case, perhaps it is regular elections that prevent the current majority party from employing such an extreme, even “nuclear” option.

Our approach differs in that we seek a rationale that involves narrow self-interest not only in the long run but also in the short run. We model committee output as a signaling game with a structure that is widely used in contract theory. Committee delegations from both the majority and the minority party send signals. The majority party in the parent chamber receives those signals.

There is no difference in cost for different signals, so our model is a “cheap talk” game. Even though the signals are *cheap*, the majority party can be better off by having *two* signals from the committee than just *one* signal.

The basic components of the game come from multiple sources. First, the idea of having two signals comes from Grossman and Helpman (2001). They explore the benefit of having multiple lobbies with contrasting biases. Legislators can fare better if they have two lobbyists with “opposite bias” than if they have either one lobbyist or two lobbyists with “like bias.” We apply this logic to the committee composition issue: the majority party may be better off if it has two committee delegations with “opposite bias.”

Secondly, most of the game settings that we use here benefit from a line of research on the “rules” choices (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, 1989; Krishna and Morgan 2001). Even though they derive several equilibria that are our starting points, their research questions are different from ours: they are interested in why Congress adopts restricted rules, whereas we are interested in why the majority party wants minority party members in the committee system. However, as will be clear later, their game settings provide some clues about how we can address our question.

In a modeling sense, our model extends the work of our predecessors in two key ways: we endogenize the committee composition decision inside the game sequence, and we allow variations in the bias of minority party members in the committee. These two improvements actually are crucial in deriving our conclusion about the committee composition decision by the majority party on the floor.

There are several other distinctive features of our model which, though not necessary for deriving our conclusion, are worth mentioning. First, if we consider the models in a principal-agent framework, our principal is the majority *party* on the floor whereas our predecessors consider the parent chamber (as a whole) as principal. Second, our equilibrium is preferred by each of the players in the game over our predecessors’ equilibria. Third, the utility functions in our model are “absolute value” loss functions whereas those in our predecessors are quadratic loss functions.

The Model

There are three players in the game: the majority party on the floor (F_{maj}), the majority party delegation to the committee (C_{maj}), and the minority party delegation to the committee (C_{min}). Each is modeled here as a unitary actor who cares about a unidimensional outcome $x \in X$. The ideal outcome for the majority party on the floor is set equal to zero without loss of generality. The ideal outcome for the majority party delegation to the committee is c ($c > 0$) and that for the minority party delegation to the committee is $-rc$ ($r > 1$).¹ All players use absolute value loss functions to evaluate actual outcomes. Thus, floor majority's utility from an outcome x is $u_{F_{\text{maj}}} = -|x|$, whereas the committee members' utilities are $u_{C_{\text{maj}}} = -|c - x|$ and $u_{C_{\text{min}}} = -|-rc - x|$, respectively.

The committee proposes a bill, b , and the floor then chooses a policy, $p \in P \subset \mathbb{R}$. The policy p results in an uncertain outcome, $x = p + \omega$, that depends on some underlying state of nature $\omega \in [0, 1]$. The state of nature, ω , is assumed to be uniformly distributed, which gives it a mean of $1/2$ and a variance of $1/12$. Lastly, there is an exogenously given status quo policy, p_o ($-1 < p_o < 0$).²

The sequence of the game is as follows. First, F_{maj} chooses either to construct the committee with C_{maj} and C_{min} or to construct the committee only with C_{maj} . Second, the nature reveals the state ω to both committee delegations, but not to F_{maj} . Third, C_{maj} proposes a bill $b \in P$ and C_{min} makes a speech $s \in [0, 1]$ about ω , simultaneously. Fourth, F_{maj} chooses a policy p . In the closed rule case, p is chosen from the set $\{b, p_o\}$; in the open rule case, F_{maj} can choose any policy in P . Finally, utility is realized to each player.

Since F_{maj} chooses how to construct the committee first, the entire game can be analyzed by focusing on two subgames separately: a bipartisan committee system with both C_{maj} and C_{min} versus majoritarian committee system with only C_{maj} . Then, based on the expected utilities from each subgame's equilibrium, we can examine which committee structure will make F_{maj} better off.

¹This represents the idea that the committee minority is ideologically more distant from the floor majority than the committee majority is from the floor majority. This is assumed for the convenience of proof, but changing the assumption does not change our substantive conclusion.

²This is assumed for the proof convenience. Changing the assumption does not affect our substantive conclusion.

A strategy $b(\omega)$ for the committee majority specifies a bill to propose for each state of nature. A strategy $s(\omega)$ for the committee minority specifies a public speech given the observed state of nature. A strategy for F_{maj} , $p(b, s)$, specifies a feasible policy after observing $b(\omega)$ and $s(\omega)$. Finally, F_{maj} forms posterior beliefs $g(b, s)$ over the state space. For each subgame, strategies and beliefs

$$(b^*(\omega), s^*(\omega), p^*(b, s), g^*(b, s))$$

comprise a weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium (wPBE) if

1. F_{maj} selects $p^*(b, s)$ that maximizes expected payoffs given $g^*(b, s)$;
2. C_{maj} and C_{min} simultaneously choose $b^*(\omega)$ and $s^*(\omega)$, respectively, to maximize payoffs given $p^*(b, s)$; and
3. the beliefs $g^*(b, s)$ are formed by using Bayes's rule wherever possible.³

Case I: Closed Rule Game

Subgame C1: Majoritarian Committee System

In this subgame, C_{maj} proposes b and F_{maj} chooses either b or p_o . Therefore, the wPBE of subgame C1⁴ is:

$$b^*(\omega) = \begin{cases} -\omega + c & \text{if } \omega \leq -c - p_o \\ c + p_o & \text{if } -c - p_o < \omega < -p_o \\ p_o & \text{if } -p_o \leq \omega \leq c - p_o \\ -\omega + c & \text{if } \omega > c - p_o \end{cases}$$

$$p^*(b) = \begin{cases} p_o & \text{if } b \in (p_o, c + p_o) \cup (c + p_o, 2c + p_o) \\ b & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

³We do not consider beliefs off the equilibrium path, hence the solution concept is “weak” PBE.

⁴The notation, C1, means **C**losed rule case and committee with only **One** party. C2 means **C**losed rule case and committee with **Two** parties. O1 and O2 means **O**pen rule cases.

$$g^*(b) = \begin{cases} -p_o & \text{if } b \in (p_o, c + p_o) \cup (c + p_o, 2c + p_o) \\ \mathbf{U}[-c - p_o, -p_o] & \text{if } b = c + p_o \\ \mathbf{U}[-p_o, -p_o + c] & \text{if } b = p_o \\ c - b & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$\Rightarrow EU_{F_{\text{maj}}}(\text{subgame C1}) = -c + c^2$$

[Proof] Observe that the beliefs are consistent with Bayes's rule wherever possible. So, it suffices to show that, given beliefs, no player has an incentive to deviate from the equilibrium strategies. Recall that the policy space, X , is a line where the ideal point of F_{maj} is the origin. Depending on the location of the status quo, p_o , there are four cases.

(i) $p_o + \omega \leq -c$ (i.e. $\omega \leq -c - p_o$): In this case, the equilibrium strategies result in an outcome of c (the ideal outcome for C_{maj}). Since C_{maj} can get the best outcome from $b^*(\omega)$, it has




Figure 1: An Equilibrium of Subgame C1

no incentive to deviate. By the same token, since F_{maj} prefers $b^*(\omega)$ to p_o given its beliefs, it also has no incentive to deviate.

(ii) $-c < p_o + \omega < 0$ (i.e. $-c - p_o < \omega < -p_o$): In this case, the equilibrium strategies result in an outcome of $p_o + \omega + c$. Since C_{maj} prefers $b^*(\omega)$ to p_o , it has no incentive to deviate. On the other hand, given beliefs, F_{maj} would have the same expected payoff from deviating to p_o . So, F_{maj} doesn't have an incentive to deviate.

(iii) $0 \leq p_o + \omega \leq c$ (i.e. $-p_o \leq \omega \leq c - p_o$): In this case, the equilibrium strategies result in an outcome of $p_o + \omega$ (the status quo outcome). Since both F_{maj} and C_{maj} are indifferent between $b^*(\omega)$ and p_o , neither has an incentive to deviate.

(iv) $p_o + \omega > c$ (i.e. $\omega > c - p_o$): Same as in the case (i), the equilibrium strategies result in an outcome of c (the ideal outcome for C_{maj}). By the same reasoning, neither F_{maj} nor C_{maj} has an incentive to deviate.

Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium result of this subgame. Using the figure, it is trivial to calculate the expected utility of F_{maj} from this subgame, which is $-c + c^2$. (Q.E.D.)

It is worth while noting that, with the majority party delegation only, the majority party on the floor should always defer to the committee, in equilibrium, simply due to the lack of information. Consequently, the committee delegation can have his/her ideal point as a final policy consequence in several cases. As we will see shortly, this is not the case if the committee is composed of both the majority party and the minority party.

Subgame C2: Bipartisan Committee System

In this subgame, C_{maj} and C_{min} simultaneously choose a bill b and a speech s , respectively. Then, based on b and s , F_{maj} chooses a policy $p \in \{b, p_o\}$. Before describing the equilibrium result, we borrow the concept **agree/disagree** from Krishna and Morgan (2001). Given a bill b and a speech s , the two committee delegations are said to **agree** if there exists an ω such that $b = b^*(\omega)$ and $s \subseteq s^*(\omega)$. If there is no such ω , then the committee delegations are said to **disagree**. Another

way to think about “agree/disagree” is as “consistent/inconsistent” (with each other.) When F_{maj} observes b , then it can construct a set of possible ω values. Based on this set of possible ω values, F_{maj} can think of a set of possible s values. If the observed s value is one of the hypothetically constructed s values, then F_{maj} would consider that b and s are consistent, or that C_{maj} and C_{min} agree.

The wPBE of subgame C2 is:

$$b^*(\omega) = \begin{cases} -\omega & \text{if } \omega \leq -2rc - p_o \\ -2rc - p_o - 2\omega & \text{if } -2rc - p_o < \omega < -rc - p_o \\ p_o & \text{if } -rc - p_o \leq \omega \leq c - p_o \\ 2c - p_o - 2\omega & \text{if } c - p_o < \omega < 2c - p_o \\ -\omega & \text{if } \omega \geq 2c - p_o \end{cases}$$

$$s^*(\omega) = -b^*(\omega)$$

$$p^*(b, s) = \begin{cases} b & \text{if } C_{\text{maj}} \text{ and } C_{\text{min}} \text{ agree} \\ p_o & \text{if } C_{\text{maj}} \text{ and } C_{\text{min}} \text{ disagree} \end{cases}$$

$$g^*(b, s) = \begin{cases} -b & \text{if } b = -s \neq p_o \\ \mathbf{U}[-rc - p_o, c - p_o] & \text{if } b = -s = p_o \\ -p_o & \text{if } b \neq -s \end{cases}$$

$$\Rightarrow EU_{F_{\text{maj}}}(\text{subgame C2}) = -r^2c^2 - c^2$$

It is very important to note that the expression $s^*(\omega) = -b^*(\omega)$ does NOT mean C_{min} follows C_{maj} 's strategy. C_{maj} and C_{min} choose their strategies simultaneously. This expression only means that, in equilibrium, two players' strategies have this relationship.

[Proof] Observe that F_{maj} is always optimizing, given its beliefs, and that the beliefs are consistent with Bayes's rule along the equilibrium path. So, it suffices to show that both C_{maj} and C_{min} has no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium strategies. One thing to note is that the deviation

by either player leads to $b \neq -s$, which ultimately results in the status quo outcome. With the same logic as in subgame C1, there are five cases depending on the location of the status quo, p_o .

(i) $p_o + \omega \leq -2rc$ (i.e. $\omega \leq -2rc - p_o$): In this case, the equilibrium strategies result in an outcome of 0 (the ideal outcome for F_{maj}). Since both C_{maj} and C_{min} prefer $b^*(\omega)$ to p_o , neither has an incentive to deviate.

(ii) $-2rc < p_o + \omega < -rc$ (i.e. $-2rc - p_o < \omega < -rc - p_o$): The equilibrium strategies result in an outcome of $-2rc - p_o - \omega$. Since C_{maj} prefers $b^*(\omega)$ to p_o , it has no incentive to deviate. And, since $b^*(\omega)$ satisfies the condition $(b + \omega) - (-rc) = (-rc) - (p_o + \omega)$, C_{min} is indifferent between $b^*(\omega)$ and p_o . So, it has no incentive to deviate.

(iii) $-rc \leq p_o + \omega \leq c$ (i.e. $-rc - p_o \leq \omega \leq c - p_o$): The equilibrium strategies result in an outcome of $p_o + \omega$ (the status quo outcome). So, both C_{maj} and C_{min} are indifferent between $b^*(\omega)$ and p_o , which means neither player has an incentive to deviate.




Figure 2: An Equilibrium of Subgame C2

(iv) $c < p_o + \omega < 2c$ (i.e. $c - p_o < \omega < 2c - p_o$): The equilibrium strategies result in an outcome of $2c - p_o - \omega$. Since C_{\min} prefers $b^*(\omega)$ to p_o , it has no incentive to deviate. And, since $b^*(\omega)$ satisfies the condition $(p_o + \omega) - c = c - (b + \omega)$, C_{maj} is indifferent between $b^*(\omega)$ and p_o . So C_{maj} has no incentive to deviate.

(v) $p_o + \omega \geq 2c$ (i.e. $\omega \geq 2c - p_o$): As in the case (i), the equilibrium strategies result in an outcome of 0 (the ideal outcome for F_{maj}). Since both C_{maj} and C_{\min} prefer $b^*(\omega)$ to p_o , neither has an incentive to deviate.

Figure 2 illustrates the equilibrium result of this subgame. Using the figure, it is trivial to calculate the expected utility of F_{maj} from this subgame, which is $-(rc \times rc + c \times c) = -r^2c^2 - c^2$. (Q.E.D.)

It is worth while noting that, similar to the subgame 1, the floor majority always defers to the committee in equilibrium due to the lack of information. However, the policy consequences do not please the bill proposer (the committee majority) as compared to the subgame 1. The floor majority can sometimes achieve its own ideal outcome (when $\omega \in (0, -2rc - p_o) \cup (2c - p_o, 1)$). The final policy consequences sometimes please the committee minority more than others (when $\omega \in (-2rc - p_o, -p_o)$), and sometimes please the committee majority more than others (when $\omega \in (-p_o, 2c - p_o)$). The next step is to determine which subgame is preferable for the majority party on the floor.

Closed Rule Game: When is subgame C2 better than subgame C1?

Since we have the wPBE results from two subgames, we can move on to the initial sequence of the closed rule game. Here, F_{maj} has to choose either to construct the majoritarian committee system only with C_{maj} or to construct the bipartisan committee system with both C_{maj} and C_{\min} .

The equilibrium of the entire game is that F_{maj} construct the bipartisan committee system with both C_{maj} and C_{\min} when

$$1 \leq r \leq \sqrt{\frac{1 - 2c}{c}}$$

[Proof] When $EU_{F_{\text{maj}}}(\text{subgame C2}) \geq EU_{F_{\text{maj}}}(\text{subgame C1})$, the subgame 2 is preferable for F_{maj} . Since $EU_{F_{\text{maj}}}(\text{subgame C1}) = -c + c^2$ and $EU_{F_{\text{maj}}}(\text{subgame C2}) = -r^2c^2 - c^2$ and since r is assumed be greater than 1, the condition $1 \leq r \leq \sqrt{\frac{1-2c}{c}}$ yields the wPBE of the subgame C2 as the equilibrium outcome of the closed rule game. (Q.E.D.)

Figure 3 combines Figure 1 and 2 in order to visually compare two subgames. We can easily recognize that, when $r = 1$, the majoritarian committee system with only C_{maj} (a strategy leading to subgame C1) is weakly dominated by the bipartisan committee system with both C_{maj} and C_{min} (a strategy leading to subgame C2). The region where F_{maj} prefers the majoritarian committee system to the bipartisan committee system is $\omega \in (-2rc + c - p_o, -c - p_o)$, the width of which is increasing in r . So, as r increases, the gain from having C_{min} decreases. But, once r is smaller than $\sqrt{\frac{1-2c}{c}}$, F_{maj} still has the positive gain. If we consider the change of c given a fixed r , the gain from option 2 decreases when c becomes larger.




Figure 3: The Closed Rule Game

< Table 1: Numerical Example >

c	r		r	c
$c = 0.01$	$1 \leq r \leq 9.90$		$r = 1$	$0 \leq c \leq 0.33$
$c = 0.05$	$1 \leq r \leq 4.24$		$r = 2$	$0 \leq c \leq 0.17$
$c = 0.1$	$1 \leq r \leq 2.83$		$r = 3$	$0 \leq c \leq 0.09$
$c = 0.2$	$1 \leq r \leq 1.73$		$r = 5$	$0 \leq c \leq 0.04$
$c = 0.3$	$1 \leq r \leq 1.15$		$r = 10$	$0 \leq c \leq 0.01$

As we can also see from the numerical examples in Table 1, c and r have a trade-off relationship. When C_{maj} is very similar to F_{maj} (i.e. c is sufficiently close to 0), F_{maj} can allow more extreme C_{min} (i.e. r can be large enough). If F_{maj} happens to have very extreme C_{min} (i.e. r is large), then it must stack very similar C_{maj} (i.e. c should be small enough) in the committee.

Case II: Open Rule Game

The open rule case is simpler than the closed rule case: the bipartisan committee system with both C_{maj} and C_{min} (subgame O2) is always better for the majority party on the floor than the majoritarian committee system with only C_{maj} (subgame O1).

Subgame O1: Majoritarian Committee System

In this subgame, C_{maj} proposes b and F_{maj} chooses any policy $p \in P$ after observing b . Therefore the wPBE of subgame O1 is:

$$\begin{aligned}
 b^*(\omega) &\in [c - a_{i+1}, c + a_i] \quad \text{if } \omega \in [a_i, a_{i+1}] \\
 p^*(b) &= \begin{cases} -\frac{a_{N-1} + a_N}{2} & \text{if } b < c - 1 \\ -\frac{a_i + a_{i+1}}{2} & \text{if } b \in [c - a_{i+1}, c + a_i] \\ -\frac{a_0 + a_1}{2} & \text{if } b > c \end{cases} \\
 g^*(b) &= \begin{cases} U[a_{N-1}, a_N] & \text{if } b < c - 1 \\ U[a_i, a_{i+1}] & \text{if } b \in [c - a_{i+1}, c + a_i] \\ U[a_0, a_1] & \text{if } b > c \end{cases}
 \end{aligned}$$




Figure 4: An Equilibrium of Subgame O1

where $a_0 = 0$, $a_i = a_1 i + 2i(1-i)c$, $a_N = 1$, and N is the largest integer such that $|2N(1-N)c| < 1$.

[Proof] This is exactly Crawford and Sobel (1982)'s "information transmission" equilibrium. See Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987, 309-312) for details. Figure 4 illustrates the equilibrium result of this subgame. (Q.E.D.)

Subgame O2: Bipartisan Committee System

In this subgame, C_{maj} and C_{min} simultaneously choose a bill b and a speech s , respectively. Then, based on observed values of b and s , F_{maj} chooses any policy $p \in P$. The wPBE of subgame O2 is:




Figure 5: An Equilibrium of Subgame O2

$$b^*(\omega) = -\omega$$

$$s^*(\omega) = \begin{cases} -2rc & \text{if } \omega \leq 1 - 2rc \\ 2rc & \text{if } \omega > 1 - 2rc \end{cases}$$

$$p^*(b, s) = \begin{cases} b & \text{if } C_{\text{maj}} \& C_{\text{min}} \text{ agree} \\ & \text{or if } C_{\text{maj}} \& C_{\text{min}} \text{ disagree and} \\ & b, b + s \in [-1, 0] \text{ and } U_{C_{\text{min}}}(s) > U_{C_{\text{min}}}(0) \\ b + s & \text{if } C_{\text{maj}} \& C_{\text{min}} \text{ disagree and} \\ & b, b + s \in [-1, 0] \text{ and } U_{C_{\text{min}}}(s) \leq U_{C_{\text{min}}}(0) \\ & \text{or if } C_{\text{maj}} \& C_{\text{min}} \text{ disagree and} \\ & b, b + s \notin [-1, 0] \\ p_o & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$g^*(b, s) = -p^*(b, s)$$

[Proof] This is exactly Krishna and Morgan (2001)'s "heterogeneous committee" equilibrium




Figure 6: The Open Rule Game

under open rule. See pp. 438-440 and p. 448 for details. Figure 5 illustrates the equilibrium result of this subgame. (Q.E.D.)

Open Rule Game: When is subgame O2 better than subgame O1?

The expected utility from the subgame O2 is larger than that from the subgame O1, because subgame O2 produces 0 expected utility, whereas subgame O1 produces a clearly negative utility. Figure 6 demonstrates this visually. Therefore, in the open rule case, a bipartisan committee system is always preferred by the floor majority over a majoritarian committee system.

Conclusion

In this paper, we show that the floor majority has an incentive to include minority party members on committees. This contrasts with our initial supposition that minority members on committees might be a burden to the floor majority. Even though the committee minority does not have any bill proposal power in our model, it constrains the committee majority in a way that serves the

floor majority. This effect stems from the fact that the minority party delegation makes a public speech about the state of nature. This provides an informational rationale for why the majority party chooses to have minority party members on committees.

We also briefly examine the relationship between the committee majority and the committee minority. If the committee minority has moderate preferences, the floor majority will have an incentive to include them on committees to improve the information available to the floor majority. On the other hand, when the committee minority is extreme, the majority party should have ideologically very similar members from their own party in the committee in order to sustain the informational benefit. In the future research we plan to explore this relationship empirically.

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