[SRH]
Stephen R. Haptonstahl
Current Research
Can the Central Intelligence Agency reorganize to avoid a 9/11
style failure? More generally, can a bureaucratic
information-gathering hierarchy (BIGH) be designed so as to make the
probability of catastrophic error arbitrarily small? Based on my
years of experience in this kind of organization -- tactical crew
aboard a deployed AEGIS cruiser -- I conjecture is that this
minimal-error BIGH is not possible. Please read the description of my
future research for a
description of the overall arc of my research.
My current research falls into two categories: work that
contributes directly to my line of research, and work that contributes
indirectly to it.
My dissertation contributes directly by developing models of
bargaining games that include uncertainty over one's own payoffs,
using a quantal response equilibrium rather than a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium. This will provide a way to test statistically models
of information aggregation that account for the incentives for
those involved.
My work in computational modeling contributes
indirectly by working to advance the norms of our discipline as
they relate to drawing inferences from computational models, while
at the same time helping to explain important phenomena such as the
development of meaning in political discourse and the emergence of
influence in citation networks. My work on the dimensionality of
roll-call data contributes indirectly by providing evidence that
Congressional interests are multifaceted, which can complicate
the efforts of an agency to comply with those interests.
Why So Serious? Explaining the Ultimatum Game.
Applies Monte Carlo tests to determine the number of subjects needed for a lab experiment, then applies a
strategic statistical model to the gathered lab data to explain overly generous offers and mysterious rejections.
[In progress]
Looking Back: an Ordered Network Model of Legal Precedent.
Network analysis is flourishing, but theories explaining why networks take the form they do are still in the
early stages of development. I am developing a network game to explain how justices choose cases to cite, where
utility for opinion authors takes the form of a new empirical measure of node importance.
[Working paper]
The Dimensionality of Congressional Voting Reconsidered.
In collaboration with Jason Roberts and Steven Smith.
We use Poole's Optimal Classification software to examine the apparent dimensionality of the roll-call record at different
levels of vote aggregation.
Presented: APSA 2008.
[Working paper]
Principal Problems: the Perils of Strategic Uncertainty in Principal-Agent Games.
Uncertain information as usually introduced in QRE models does not solve the "zero-likelihood" problem for principal-agent games.
Accepted for presentation at SPSA, 2009.
[In progress]
Veto Bargaining in the Russian Duma.
In collaboration with Steven Smith, Thomas Remington, and Moshe Haspel.
We are taking a multidimensional approach to examining the movement of bills toward the president during veto bargaining with the Duma.
[In progress]
Elicited Priors for National Security Research.
In collaboration with Jeff Gill, John Freeman, and Aaron Rapport.
We are developing a browser-based software system for eliciting structured information about social networks
for updating Bayesian models of connectivity.
[In progress]
Why Does the Majority Party Bother to Have Minority Party Members on Committees?.
In collaboration with Hong Min Park.
Congressional floor majorities gain information by forming bipartisan committees; understanding this yields
testable hypotheses about how the ideological extremity of opposing committee delegations affects the choice
of composition of a party's own delegation.
Presented: APSA 2008, Midwest 2008.
[Working paper]